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Although auditor choice has been studied extensively in the audit literature, 
research examining this issue in developing markets has been scarce thus far. The 
objective of this  study is to investigate the impact of corporate governance (CG) 
on external auditor choice in the context of the small Kuwaiti emerging market. 
Specifically, the present study uses both a survey and hand-collected 2012 fiscal-
year data pertinent to 53 Kuwaiti listed companies to examine whether firm’s 
auditor choice is influenced by company’s board size, board independence, 
directors’ shareholdings, Audit Committee (AC) size, and/or AC independence. 
Using a logistic regression model, the study’s results reveal evidence of a 
meaningful relation between auditor choice and AC size, company’s leverage, 
and company’s belonging to the finance sector. These findings could be useful to 
market regulators and corporate executives, especially in Kuwait, in improving 
CG practices within corporations. The research findings should also be of value to 
international researchers interested in carrying out related research.
Keywords: Corporate governance; audit committee, board, audit independence, 
auditor choice, developing markets, Kuwait.
I.  INTRODUCTION
The dramatic collapse of several gigantic 
corporations, like Enron and WorldCom, during 
the first decade of the 21st century has motivated 
market regulators in numerous countries to 
launch legislative campaigns to enhance the 
effectiveness of corporate governance (CG) 
policies and procedures (Jones, 2011; Aguilera, 
2005). As much of these major bankruptcies 
have been linked to disturbing fraudulent 
accounting reporting scandals, one of the major 
objectives legislations aimed at achieving 
was to enhance the quality of external audit 
functions responsible for validating the 
credibility of company’s financial reports (e.g., 
IAASB, 2009; European Commission, 2010; 
PCAOB, 2011; FRC, 2013). Consequently, 
company’s selection of the external audit firm 
due to its potential effects on audit quality has 
become a crucial decision for companies to 
make in recent years.
Audit research (e.g., Becker et al. 1998; Kim 
et al. 2003; Hsu et al. 2015; Ben-Hassoun et 
al. 2018; Jiraporn et al. 2018) has long viewed 
audit firm type (Big 4 vs. non-Big 4) as an 
influential factor in determining the quality 
of the financial statements audit. Researchers 
(e.g., Fan and Wong, 2005; Eshleman and Guo, 
2014; Asthana et al. 2015; Knechel, 2016) have 
typically viewed ‘Big’ audit firms to provide 
higher quality audit than ‘non-Big’ firms as a 
result of their competitive advantages in terms 
of scale of operations, technical competencies, 
and market reputation. Accordingly, several 
audit studies (e.g., Firth and Smith, 1992; 
Beasley and Petroni, 2001; Lin and Liu, 2009; 
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Hsu et al. 2015; Husnin et al. 2016; Lai et al. 
2017) were carried out to investigate factors 
related to audit client’s choice to hire “Big 4” 
vs. “non-Big 4” external audit firm. Although 
audit research has investigated auditor choice 
for quite some time, a relatively recent stream 
of this research has focused on the effect of 
CG factors on this choice (Hay et al. 2006). 
Empirical findings about the relation between 
CG mechanisms and auditor choice have mainly 
stemmed from developed countries Although a 
few recent studies have examined this relation 
in some developing countries (e.g., Husnin et 
al. 2016; Alfraih, 2017), empirical findings 
about this issue in the context of developing 
countries’ markets are still scant. Furthermore, 
the impact of CG on auditor choice deserves 
extra attention and further investigation by 
audit researchers in light of the recent growing 
role of CG on corporate decision-making 
(Karaibrahimoglu, 2013). 
As indicated, much of the auditor choice 
research has been concentrated on audit markets 
of Anglo-Saxon and developed countries’ 
markets (e.g., Beasley and Petroni, 2001; 
Abbot et al. 2003; Ashbaugh and Warfield, 
2003; Srinidhi et al. 2014; Quick et al. 2018), 
with only very limited research performed 
in other markets. Moreover, although a few 
empirical studies were conducted to investigate 
relation between CG and auditor choice in 
some developing markets (e.g., Lin and Liu, 
2009; Husnin et al. 2016), there has been very 
limited research examining auditor choice in 
the Middle East region. This is surprising as 
this topic has been a focus of research by many 
researchers and for a long period of time. We 
cannot ignore the possibility that empirical 
findings reported in prior research about this 
research issue, which are largely based on 
data from developed countries, may not be 
necessarily applicable to the less-developed 
markets’ settings. That is true since developing 
countries, like Kuwait, are said to have less 
developed stock markets and significantly 
different audit market settings (Woodward, 
1997; Fan and Wong, 2005). For example, 
unlike in developed countries, economic policy-
making in developing countries is generally 
driven by political goals rather than economic 
yield maximization (DeWenter and Malatesta, 
2001). In addition, the responsibilities of and 
relations between owners, boards of directors, 
and audit functions of companies in the Middle 
East are generally unclear and overlapping 
(Ben-Hassoun  et al. 2018). Moreover, the 
Kuwaiti market provides a setting that is quite 
different from markets where this research 
issue has been typically explored before. That 
is true as, unlike in audit markets of developed 
countries where much of prior research has 
been conducted, audit guidance by Kuwaiti 
local professional organizations is very much 
lacking, and the audit profession is solely 
regulated and monitored by government-
related agencies (Alhajri, 2017). Just like other 
Gulf Countries Cooperation (GCC)  markets, 
the Kuwaiti market is also characterized by 
some idiosyncratic cultural traits, where family 
and tribal social structures as well as informal 
relationships may interfere with CG policies 
and procedures (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; 
Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). In addition, 
unlike developed markets, where much of prior 
auditor choice research has been conducted, 
the Kuwaiti market is also featured by high 
family ownerships (Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari 
2013), and highly concentrated corporate 
ownership structures (Alfraih et al. 2012). At 
the same time, the effectiveness of CG is said 
to be undermined due to the high ownership 
concentration (Yasin and Shehab, 2004). As the 
demand for audit services is closely related to 
the extent of agency problems (Dye, 1993),  it 
seems that investigating auditor choice in such 
a market, where agency costs are relatively 
low (Anderson et al. 2003), but CG regimes 
are relatively weak may provide new insights 
about this issue. Moreover, it was only in June 
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2016, when the official CG rules went to effect 
in the Kuwaiti market as set by the newly 
formed Capital Markets Authority. At the time 
of the present study, therefore, no official and 
unified set of GC rules were in effect in the 
Kuwaiti market, with the existing trivial rules 
related to CG being both seriously lacking 
and scattered over different laws. These rules 
mainly covered thresholds related to board 
composition, terms, and meetings. Hence, 
much of the CG policies and processes adopted 
by corporations at the time of conducting this 
study were largely made on a voluntary basis. 
As this research study was carried out prior 
to the official date of implementing the CG 
code, it offers an outstanding opportunity for 
studying the relation between CG and auditor 
choice in a market setting where much of the 
CG processes are adopted voluntarily. The 
current study, therefore, aims at contributing 
to the audit literature by empirically examining 
whether company’s auditor choice is impacted 
by certain CG characteristics, namely, 
board size, board independence, directors’ 
shareholdings, Audit Committee (AC) size, 
and/or AC independence in the context of the 
Kuwaiti emerging market, where this kind of 
research has been hardly studied. Alfraih (2017) 
was among the very few studies that examined 
auditor choice in the GCC region. He examined 
the relation between some board characteristics 
and auditor choice using data from the Kuwaiti 
market. Alfraih (2017) investigation, however, 
was limited to examining the impact of board 
characteristics on firm’s selection of the 
external audit firm. He found evidence of a 
significant relation between auditor choice and 
board size, independence, and diversity. The 
current study extends this line of investigation 
by examining the impact on auditor choice of 
CG characteristics, including not only board 
characteristics but also other aspects of CG such 
as Audit Committee (AC) characteristics.  The 
present study, therefore, aims at extending this 
line of research audit literature by providing a 
more comprehensive evidence about this kind 
of issues from a voluntary-CG-adoption setting 
where this kind of research has been rarely 
investigated before. 
The empirical evidence offered by the current 
study, therefore, is somehow unique in that 
it offers insights about the relation between 
CG and audit choice in a setting where CG 
processes are applied voluntarily by firms. 
Such an evidence is expected to be of value to 
the audit literature as research examining the 
interaction between ownership mechanisms 
and voluntary CG practices is still rare 
(Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Salterio et al. 
2013). 
The study’s results show that auditor choice 
in Kuwaiti is positively related to the size of 
the company’s AC and company’s financial 
leverage, while it is negatively related to 
company’s affiliation to the finance industry. 
The empirical results reported in the present 
study about the relation between firm’s CG and 
audit firm selection is expected to be of interest 
and value not only for accounting researchers 
but also for regulatory bodies as well. Similar 
to accounting researchers, market regulators 
would surely be interested in understanding if 
and how processes and mechanisms are linked 
to the level of external audit quality provided 
about corporate financial reports. Accounting 
and business educators may also find the 
results offered by the present study useful for 
teaching purposes.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
     AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Auditor Type and Audit Quality
The major role of external auditors is to 
minimize the information asymmetries 
between principles (e.g., shareholders) and 
agents (e.g., management), and hence limiting 
agency problems in capital markets (Watts 
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and Zimmerman, 1983; Ball, 2001; Hope 
et al. 2008). The reliability of corporate 
financial reports is closely linked to the level 
of audit quality provided (Husnin et al. 2016). 
DeAngelo (1981) posits that external audit 
quality can basically be described as the joint 
probability that the external auditor will detect 
and report irregularities in financial reports. 
DeAngelo (1981) further suggests that large 
external audit firms (e.g., Big 4) have greater 
incentives to deliver higher quality audit 
services than smaller ones because they have 
higher reputational capital to protect. Hence, 
audit research (e.g., Davidson and Neu, 1993; 
Lennox, 1999; Knechel, 2016) has typically 
associated higher levels of audit quality to 
“Big” audit firms. Empirical research findings 
documented in audit research (e.g., e.g., 
Johnson and Lys, 1990; Firth and Smith, 
1992; Eshleman and Guo, 2014) are generally 
supportive of the association between 
auditor type and the external audit quality. In 
particular, larger audit firms (i.e., Big 4) are 
found to provide higher levels of audit and 
monitoring over corporate financial reports 
(Lee et al. 2003; Farbar, 2005; Lennox, 2005; 
Gul, et al. 2009; Guedhami et al. 2014). Large 
audit firms are also believed to possess higher 
levels of independence and expertise that 
enable them to do a better job in discovering 
and reporting misstatements in firm’s financial 
statements (DeFond, 1992; Reed et al. 2000).
Previous audit research (e.g., Hay and Davis, 
2004; Beisland et al. 2015) suggests that a firm’s 
choice of an audit firm reflects its desired level 
of audit quality. Audit research (e.g., Hsu et 
al. 2015) also suggests that ‘Big 4’ audit firms 
differ from ‘non-Big 4’ firms in terms of the 
level of quality, specialty, and expertise they 
are capable of providing. Company’s selection 
of external audit firm, however, is expected 
to be influenced by several considerations, 
including pressures of the different groups 
of firm’s stakeholders (Knechel et al. 2008; 
Beisland et al. 2015). Moreover, audit research 
(e.g., Hay et al. 2008) posits that auditor 
choice reflects also firm’s internal control 
and governance processes. As audit quality 
is mostly not observable, prior audit research 
has typically used certain indicators as proxies 
for this variable one of which is the size of 
the audit firm (Palmrose, 1988; Beisland et 
al. 2015). Hay et al. (2006) indicate that audit 
firm type (i.e., Big 4 vs. non-Big 4) is the most 
frequently used surrogate for audit quality in 
the audit literature. 
Corporate Governance and Auditor Choice
Corporate governance (CG) can basically 
be defined as the set of procedures and 
mechanisms used for the direction and 
control of firm’s activities and operations 
(OECD, 2004). The aim of CG is to help in 
improving firm’s performance, and hence, 
increasing its economic value (Jarboui et al. 
2015). According to signaling theory, firms 
may use the choice of their external auditors 
to signal to the market participants, including 
their own shareholders, the status of their CG 
systems (Husnin et al. 2016). In this sense, the 
hiring of a high-quality external auditor (Big 
4) vis-à-vis a low-quality auditor (non-Big 
4) entails a mechanism for communicating to 
the market information about effectiveness of 
the firm’s CG system, which is anticipated to 
be eventually reflected in firm’s stock prices 
(Husnin et al. 2016).
Audit research (Parker et al. 2005) indicates 
that auditor choice has significant practical 
implications on firm’s activities. Research 
also suggests that when providing their audit 
services, external auditors play a significant 
role in externally monitoring management 
actions on behalf of firm’s stakeholders, and as 
such, are regarded as an important complement 
to firm’s CG (Cohen et al. 2002; Lin and 
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Liu, 2009). Previous research (e.g., Cohen et 
al. 2002; Liu and Sun, 2005) has shown that 
the effectiveness of CG and internal control 
mechanisms is significantly determined by 
board and AC characteristics. Prior research 
(e.g., Coffee, 2002; Ashbaugh and Warfield, 
2003) has also suggested that the level of audit 
quality is a reflection of the quality of firm’s 
GC and internal controls processes. 
CG mechanisms can either be decided internally 
and voluntarily by firm’s board of directors 
and management, or externally mandated 
by market regulators (Beisland et al. 2015). 
Although CG-related issues have been the 
focus of a great deal of audit research, much of 
this research has been focused on issues related 
to mandatory CG practices, with relatively 
little empirical research carried out to examine 
audit issues related to voluntary CG practices, 
especially in developing markets’ settings 
(Bozec and Bozec, 2007; Salterio et al. 2013). 
Moreover, research examining the relation 
between external auditing and CG mechanisms 
is still inconclusive and paradoxical (Hay et al. 
2006; Karaibrahimoglu, 2013; Beisland et al. 
2015). 
III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Board size
Agency theory advocates (e.g., Jensen, 1993) 
suggest a positive relation between board size 
and board’s monitoring capabilities. Likewise, 
the audit fees literature includes several studies 
(e.g., Karim et al. 2015: Jizi and Nehme, 2018) 
showing a positive association between board 
size and external audit fees, suggesting that 
larger boards of directors tend to demand 
greater assurance levels (i.e., more external 
audit work) from external auditors  Audit and 
CG research (e.g., Hay et al. 2006; Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2008; Beisland et al. 2015; Ntim et al. 
2015a) suggests that the effectiveness of CG 
and controls within firms is considerably linked 
to board size. There are diverse views, however, 
on how governance and control processes 
are influenced by board size. Some research, 
for example, posits that smaller boards may 
not possess the capacity needed to discharge 
the board’s different responsibilities (Guest, 
2009), and that larger boards of directors may 
be more capable in exercising governance and 
monitoring over firm’s activities (Adams and 
Mehran, 2003; Di Pietra et al, 2008; Shurkeri et 
al. 2012). Other research (Jensen, 1993; Cheng 
et al. 2008; Jensen, 2012; Ntim et al. 2015), 
on the other hand, suggests that large boards of 
directors may be less effective in monitoring 
as communication, coordination, and decision 
making are slower and more difficult among 
larger number of board members, and that 
smaller boards are more effective in monitoring 
management actions. Lin and Liu (2009) 
suggest that there is a positive relation between 
board size and the level of CG and controls, and 
that firms with smaller boards of directors may 
choose not to hire high-quality external auditor 
to sustain the vagueness of their reported gains. 
Using data related to 184 Chinese firms, they 
performed an examination of this relation, and 
found evidence of a positive relation between 
board size and firm recruitment of high-quality 
audit firms. Beisland et al. (2015) performed 
a similar examination using a sample of 379 
microfinance firms. Their results, however, 
could not report any significant relation 
between board size and auditor choice. 
Similarly, Quick et al. (2018) examined the 
same issue in the German market and found 
evidence of a positive relation between board 
size and the selection of a Big 4 audit firm. 
It appears, therefore, that board size may be 
influential in the selection of the audit firm 
type. Given the mixed views and empirical 
results about the relation between board size 
and the auditor choice, the current study does 
not predict a direction of this relation, and the 
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study’s first hypothesis is stated as: 
H1: there is a significant relation between 
board size and firm’s selection of a ‘Big 4’ 
audit firm.
Board’s Independence
According to the Signaling theory, firm’s 
board of directors tend to hire high quality 
auditors (e.g., Big 4) to signal to the market 
their commitment to high-quality monitoring 
and controls. Independent directors are more 
likely to do so due to their trivial stake in the 
firm, and because of their greater incentive to 
preserve their professional reputations (Wu, 
2012).
The substitution theory, on the other hand, 
suggests that unlike inside directors who 
are typically concerned with self-interested 
interim economic goals, independent board 
members do not have substantial financial 
interests in the company, and hence are 
expected to direct company’s operations 
from a broader and altruistic perspective 
that does not focus on short-term financial 
results (Coffey and Wang, 1998; Liao et al. 
2015). This would enable independent board 
members to practice more effective control 
and monitoring over company’s activities, 
including financial reporting, which may 
substitute for the need for high-quality auditors 
(i.e., Big 4 auditors).   The percentage of non-
executive members in the company’s board of 
directors is viewed as an indicator of strong 
CG (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hay et al. 2006; 
Liao et al. 2015; Beisland et al. 2015; Rashied, 
2018), and is positively associated with audit 
quality (O’Sullivan, 2000; Salleh, et al. 2006). 
Moreover, accounting research (e.g. Beasley, 
1996; Uzun et al. 2004; Peasnell et al. 2005; 
Marra et al. 2011) shows that instances of 
fraudulent financial reporting and earnings 
management are negatively related to the 
proportion of independent board members. 
The potential impact of board independence 
on auditor choice has been investigated by a 
number of studies in the audit literature (e.g. 
Beasley and Petroni, 2001; Jiraporn et al. 
2018). While Beasley and Petroni (2001) 
found evidence of a positive relation between 
board independence and the selection of a 
‘Big” audit firm, Jiraporn et al. (2018) found 
no evidence of such a relation. The empirical 
results, therefore, are mixed and still limited. 
The current study aims at exploring this issue, 
and the study’s next research hypothesis, 
therefore, is as follows:
H2: there is a significant relation between 
board independence and firm’s selection of 
a ‘Big 4’ audit firm.
Directors’ Shareholdings:
Agency theory suggests that agency costs 
normally arise as a result of the potential 
conflicts of interests between principals 
and agents (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). 
These agency costs increase (decrease) when 
information asymmetries between principals 
and agents are high (low). As high agency 
costs are detrimental to corporate activities and 
operations, companies are typically anticipated 
to aim at reducing them. Audit research (e.g., 
DeFond, 1992; Anderson et al. 2003) suggests 
that firms’ demand for external auditing is 
primarily meant to reduce the information 
asymmetries and agency conflicts between 
owners (principles) and management (agents). 
Audit research (e.g., Francis and Wilson 1988; 
DeFond 1992) also suggests that stockholders’ 
need to monitor managerial actions increases 
when there is a greater separation between 
ownership and control (e.g., less management 
ownership). Research (e.g., Yeoh and Jubb, 
2002) further suggests that when agency 
costs are high, company’s management tend 
to demand high-quality audit to signal to 
the market their openness to high level of 
monitoring. It is assumed, therefore, that 
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when board members own less shares in the 
company, separation between ownership and 
control will be high, and hence, the demand for 
high-quality audit (Big 4) would be high. It is 
surprising that no previous research, the author 
is aware of, has examined the possible impact 
of directors’ shareholdings on auditor’s choice. 
To explore such an issue, the third hypothesis 
is stated as follows: 
H3: there is a significant and positive 
relation between directors’ shareholdings 
and firm’s selection of a ‘Big 4’ audit firm.
AC Size
According to DeFond and Francis (2005), 
the size of AC is an indicator of board’s 
commitment to allocate resource to preserve 
high quality financial reporting. At present, 
most stock markets in the world require that 
firm’s AC consist of a sufficient number of 
members. The main objective for that is to 
empower AC’s with ample human resource 
to enable them to carry out their duties 
effectively. It would be intuitive to anticipate 
that as AC size increases, there will be more 
resources and talents available, and hence, 
AC’s monitoring and supervision would be 
more effective. Empirically, previous audit 
research found a direct association between 
AC size and effective monitoring (e.g., Leuz 
and Verrecchia, 2000; Al-Ajmi, 2008) as well 
as financial reporting quality (e.g., Klein, 
2002; Yang and Krishnan, 2005; Johl et al. 
2012). As larger AC’s are associated with an 
increased capacity for monitoring and control, 
they would be expected to be set to handle and 
even demand higher levels of external audit 
quality. Empirical research examining and 
documenting the relation between AC size 
and corporate hiring of ‘Big 4’ audit firms is 
very rare and still lacking. Husnin et al. (2016) 
and Karaibrahimoglu (2013) are the only 
two studies, the author is aware of, that have 
studied this relation. While Husnin et al. (2016) 
could not find any significant evidence of this 
relation, Karaibrahimoglu (2013) showed only 
a weak evidence of a positive relation between 
AC size and auditor choice. It seems, therefore, 
that more research about this relation is still 
needed. At the time of the current study, there 
were no official rules requiring firms to form 
AC in the Kuwaiti market, with much of AC 
formation by firms made on a voluntary basis. 
Examining the relation between AC size and 
auditor choice in such a setting, therefore, 
would be interesting to explore. The study’s 
fourth hypothesis, therefore, is:
H4: there is a significant and positive relation 
between AC size and firm’s selection of a 
‘Big 4’ audit firm.
AC Independence
Independent AC members are expected to be 
associated with high-quality financial reports 
(Xie et al. 2003; Abbott et al. 2004). Agency 
theory implies that control and supervision 
over firm’s activities and operations are carried 
out best when they are carried out by parties 
independent from management (Andres et 
al. 2005). Individuals who are not engaged 
in managerial routine decisions and actions 
are expected to be neutral and more objective 
when reviewing firm’s operations (Husnin et 
al. 2016). Therefore, and for the purpose of 
promoting independent monitoring and control 
over management actions, much of the present 
CG rules and regulations around the world 
require corporations to include at least one 
independent non-staff member in their AC’s 
(Yatim, 2009). In addition, research has shown 
that the inclusion of independent members 
in firms’ board and AC’s is associated with 
enhanced levels of corporate performance 
(Daily et al. 2003; Huang and Chan, 2013), and 
more effective control (e.g., Abbott et al. 2003; 
Bhagat et al. 2008; Upadhyay et al. 2013), and 
an increased demand for audit quality (DeFond 
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and Zhang, 2014). It is natural, therefore, to 
expect AC’s with more independent members 
to be more inclined to seek hiring high-quality 
auditors (e.g., Big 4 firm). It follows that 
the chance of selecting a ‘Big 4’ audit firm 
is positively related to AC independence. 
Therefore, the study’s fifth research hypothesis 
is: 
H5: there is a significant and positive 
relation between AC independence and 
firm’s selection of a ‘Big 4’ audit firm.
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Data
The data needed to undertake the research 
hypotheses of interest in this study were 
gathered via a survey constructed by the 
author (see Appendix) that was sent to 194 
companies listed on KSE by the end of year 
2012. At the time of this study, this data was 
the most recent set of data available with the 
needed information about the study’s variables. 
Individuals with particular managerial 
responsibilities within the contacted 
companies were asked to respond to the survey 
to provide among other things, information 
about company’s external audit firm, board 
characteristics, AC characteristics, in addition 
to other organizational characteristics. The 
questionnaire survey, therefore, was used to 
gather data related to the Big 4, BDSIZE, BD_
INDP, BD_OWN, AC_SIZE, AC_INDP, and 
INDUS variables. Moreover, data pertinent to 
the SIZE, and LEV financial statement varaibles 
were manually collected from each company’s 
annual report. Observation pertinent to 122 
firms were initially collected. This number was 
reduced, however, due to some missing data, 
resulting in a final sample of 53 companies. 
The final sample represented around 27% of 
the 199 total number of KSE listed companies 
at the end of 2012. This sample consisted of 
data related to 15 financial companies and 38 
non-financial companies.
Model
The following logistic regression model that is 
based on earlier related audit research (e.g., Lin 
and Liu, 2009; Husnin et al. 2016; Beisland 
et al. 2015) is used to examine the research 
hypotheses of interest in the present study:
Big 4 =β0+ β1 BDSIZE  + β2 BD_INDP 
         + β3 BD_OWN +  β4AC_SIZE  
         + β5 AC_INDP + β6 SIZE +β7LEV
         + β8 INDUST  +  ε     
Where: 
BIG 4    = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if 
the company is audited by EY, Deloitte, PwC, 
or KPMG, and 0 otherwise.
BD_SIZE = the total number of company’s 
board members.
 BD_INDP= the percentage of board members 
who are independent from the 
company.
BD_OWN = a dummy variable with a value of 
1 if the board’s shareholdings equal or exceed 
5% of the company’s total shares outstanding, 
and 0 otherwise.
AC_SIZE = the number of company’s AC 
members.
AC_INDP = a dummy variable with        a value 
of 1 if most of the company’s AC members 
are independent from the company, and 0 
otherwise. 
SIZE   = the natural log of the total assets.
LEV   = the ratio of the company’s long-term 
liabilities to its total assets.
INDUS   = a dummy variable with a value of 
1 if the company belongs to the finance sector, 
and 0 otherwise.
ε   = error term. 
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Variables Measurement
The dependent variable in the research model 
(Big 4) is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if the company is audited by one of the Big 
4 audit firms and zero if not. The Big 4 variable 
is used as a measure of the type of the external 
audit firm. An audit firm is classified as a Big 
4 firm if it is an affiliate of Ernst and Young, 
Deloitte, KPMG, or PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC). The BD_SIZE independent variable 
is measured as the number of members in the 
firm’s board of directors, and is included in the 
research model as a measure of firm’s board 
size to test the study’s first hypothesis (H1). As 
specified earlier, board size is expected to be 
significantly related to the selection of a Big 
4 audit firm, but no prediction is made with 
respect to the sign of the BD_SIZE variable’s 
regression. The BD_INDP independent 
variable is used as a proxy for board 
independence, and is included in the model to 
test the second research hypothesis (H2). This 
variable was measured as the percentage of 
independent directors on the board of directors. 
The regression coefficient of the BD_INDP 
variable is predicted to have a positive sign. The 
BD_OWN independent variable is added to the 
model as a measure of directors’ shareholdings, 
and is employed to examine the third research 
hypothesis (H3), and is anticipated to have a 
positive sign. The AC_SIZE variable is used 
as a measure of AC size and is added to the 
regression equation to test the fourth research 
hypothesis (H4). To examine the fifth research 
hypothesis (H5), the AC_INDP variable is 
used added to the research model as a measure 
of AC independence, and is predicted to have 
a positive regression coefficient. This variable 
was measured using a self-reported question of 
whether most of the company’s AC members 
are independent of the company.
Control Variables 
Audit research (e.g., Guest, 2009; Hassan et 
al. 2017) suggests that larger firms have more 
incentives to strengthen monitoring and controls 
over their operation as they are expected to 
be exposed to greater levels of agency costs, 
and are more likely to raise funds from capital 
markets. Larger companies are also expected 
to be financially more capable, and hence, to 
be more willing to pay the typically higher 
audit fees charged by Big 4 auditors (Francis 
and Simon, 1987). Therefore, to control 
for any potential effect of company size on 
auditor choice, the SIZE variable is added to 
the research model, which is measured as the 
natural log of company’s total assets. Likewise, 
companies with high debts have higher agency 
costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Sweeney, 
1994; Fan and Wong, 2005), and hence, are 
expected to have greater incentives to stronger 
and more effective monitoring over corporate 
financial reports in order to reduce their cost of 
capital (Reed et al. 2000). In addition, previous 
related studies (e.g., Hope et al. 2008; Ben-
Hassoun et al. 2018) suggest that company’s 
leverage may influence auditor choice as it is 
considered a proxy for audit risks (e.g., Chan et 
al. 1993; Whisenant et al. 2003). Accordingly, 
and consistent with similar previous research 
(e.g., Hsu et al. 2018; Ben-Hassoun et al. 2018; 
Hsu et al. 2015; Lin and Liu, 2009), the LEV 
variable is added to the regression model as a 
measure of company’s leverage. This variable 
is measured as the company’s long-term 
liabilities to total assets, and is expected to 
have a positive regression coefficient. Previous 
research (e.g., Maletta and Wright, 1996; 
Hutchinson and Gul, 2004; Hassan et al. 2017) 
suggests that CG processes and procedures 
may be influenced by the specific industry the 
company is affiliated to. In Kuwait, companies 
in the finance industry are exclusively subjected 
to a dual monitoring and supervision by both 
the Central Bank and CMA. In addition, 
the Central Bank typically requires some 
additional requirements with regards to the 
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hiring of executives by financial institutions. It 
also routinely performs additional monitoring 
over the operations of financial institutions. 
Accounting research (e.g., Beasley et al. 1999) 
also suggests that misstatements in financial 
reports are more likely in financial institutions. 
Hence, the IDUS dummy variable is included 
to the research model to control for the possible 
effect of company’s affiliation to the finance 
sector. This value is coded 1 if the company 
belong to the finance industry and 0 if not. The 
IDUS variable is predicted to have a positive 
coefficient. 
V. RESULTS
Panels A and B in Table 1 show some 
descriptive statistics pertinent to the study’s 
continuous and dichotomous variables, 
respectively. As demonstrated in Panel A, the 
mean total assets of the sample of companies is 
about KD 265 million1. This table also shows 
that the mean leverage ratio of the sample 
of companies is around 0.14. These results 
indicate that the sample of firms included in 
this study’s sample are, on average, smaller 
in size and less leveraged than the sample 
used in Alfraih (2017) study. The descriptive 
statistics also show that the mean board size 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Continuous variables:
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.
BD_SIZE 5 3 10 5.79 1.35
 3     
BD_INDP 5 0.00 1 0.2817 0.34002
 3     
AC_SIZE 5 0 10 3.96 1.901
 3     
Total Assets 
(KD)
5 4,600,717 5,976,684,000 264,556,377.68 846,573,651.57
 3     
LEV 5 0.001 0.754 0.14158 0.188997
 3     
Panel B: Categorical variables: 
 Value Frequency   %  .
BIG4 0 31 58.5
 1 22 41.5
BD_OWN 0 8 15.1
 1 45 84.9
AC_INDP 0 25 47.2
 1 28 52.8
INDUS 0 38 71.7
 1 15 28.3
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of the sampled companies is close to 5.78 
members, with a standard deviation of about 
1.35. This is comparable to the mean board 
size of 6.1 reported in Alfraih (2017) study. 
The mean percentage of independent board 
members is approximately 0.2817. This mean 
percentage of board independence is relatively 
low compared to that reported in other markets 
with stronger CG regulatory environments. 
For example, the mean percentage of board 
independence equaled 58% in US (Klein, 
2002), 53% in Australia (O’Sullivan et al. 
2008), and 47% in UK (Li et al. 2008). It is, 
however, somehow comparable to the reported 
means of 33% in Spain (Mendez and Garcia, 
2007), and 38% in Italy (Allegrini and Greco, 
2013).  The relatively low mean of board 
independence reported in the present study is 
most likely due to the lack of solid official CG 
rules in the Kuwaiti market during the period 
of time examined. It is worth noting, however, 
that Alfraih (2017) study reports a mean 
percentage of board independence of 78% 
using a sample from the Kuwaiti market. One 
possible explanation for this higher percentage 
reported by Alfraih (2017) is the use of a 
larger sample (183) and from a different 
year (2013). The mean AC size of the study 
sample is approximately 4, ranging from zero 
for companies that had no AC to 102. Panel 
B in the same table shows some frequency 
descriptive statistics of the study’s dummy 
variables. As Panel B shows, around 42 percent 
of the sample of companies were audited by a 
Big-4 audit firm, which is fairly comparable to 
the 59 percent reported previously in Kuwait 
by Alfraih (2017), the 48 percent reported in 
Turkey by Karaibrahimoglu (2013), and the 
60 percent reported in Malaysia by Husnin et 
al. (2016). Panel B also shows that directors’ 
shareholdings equaled or exceeded 5% in 
approximately 85 percent of the sample of 
companies, and that most of the AC members 
were independent in about 53 percent of the 
sampled companies. The descriptive statistics 
in Panel B also demonstrate that around 
28 percent (15 companies) of the sampled 
companies are financial companies, while 
the other 72 percent (38 companies) are non-
financial companies.
Pearson correlations among the explanatory 
variables are shown in Table 2. In general, 
correlations among the variables are relatively 
low, with the greatest correlation equal 0.535 
(p-value = .00) between the SIZE variable 
and the LEV variable. The correlation 
results, therefore, do not indicate a sign of a 
multicollinearity problem. 
Table 2: Pearson Correlations 
BD_SIZE BD_INDP BD_OWN AC_SIZE AC_INDP SIZE LEV INDUS
BD_SIZE 1
BD_INDP 0.022 1
BD_OWN -0.184 0.157 1
AC_SIZE 0.072 -0.072 0.243 1
AC_INDP -0.09 0.184 0.129 0.202 1
SIZE .529** 0.014 -0.233 -0.148 0.061 1
LEV .408** -0.025 -0.234 -0.144 -0.151 .535** 1
INDUS 0.223 -0.008 0.031 .302* 0.006 .311* 0.241 1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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Results of the logistic regression model are 
shown in Table 3. Results in this table show that 
the research model has an overall percentage of 
correct classification of about 59 percent, with 
a Chi-square value of 18.703. As shown in the 
table, the regression coefficient of the BD_
SIZE variable has a positive but insignificant 
regression coefficient (p-value = 0.162). This 
result, therefore, does not provide support for 
the study’s first hypothesis (H1) of a significant 
relation between board size and selecting a Big 
4 audit firm. The insignificant relation between 
board size and hiring a ‘Big’ audit firm reported 
in the present study, however, is similar to 
findings reported in several previous related 
studies (e.g., Beisland et al. 2015; Husnin et al. 
2016). The regression results also show that the 
coefficient of the BD_INDP variable is positive, 
as predicted, but is insignificant (0.104), which 
does not provide support to the study’s second 
hypothesis (H2). The insignificant result 
reported about the relation between board 
independence and auditor choice may be due to 
members’ independence in appearance but not 
in actual substance from corporate executives 
(Prencipe and Bar-Yosef, 2011). The regression 
results also do not provide support to the third 
hypothesis (H3) as the regression coefficients 
of the BD_OWN variable is not statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.716). This insignificant 
relation between directors’ shareholdings and 
external auditor choice, therefore, does not 
add validity to the notion of owners as good 
stewards as suggested by some earlier research 
(e.g., Davis et al. 1997; Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis, 2003). It appears, therefore, that the 
three board characteristics examined in the 
present study do not appear to be strongly 
related to auditor choice in the Kuwaiti market. 
The regression results also indicate that the 
regression coefficient of the AC_SIZE has 
the predicted positive sign and is moderately 
significant (p-value = 0.064). This result, 
therefore, provides fair support to the study’s 
fourth hypothesis (H4) of a positive relation 
between AC size and the selection of a Big 4 
audit firm. This finding is consistent with the 
complementary perspective of the relation 
between CG and the external audit function 
(Carcello et al. 2002). That is consistent with 
findings documented in related audit research 
from other markets (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000; Al-Ajmi, 2008) of a significant relation 
between the effective monitoring and AC size. 
The results, however, show that the coefficient 
of AC_INDP variable is insignificant (p-value 
= 0.587), and hence do not provide support 
the fifth hypothesis (H5). This insignificant 
result between AC independence and auditor 
choice is similar, however, to that reported 
in other related studies (e.g., Husnin et al. 
2016). Finally, the regression results reveal 
that the regression coefficients of the LEV and 
IDUS control variables are both statistically 
significant, with p-values of 0.028 and 0.040, 
respectively, while the coefficient of the SIZE 
control variable is not (p-value = 0.875). The 
positive relation between firm’s leverage and 
the selection of a Big 4 firm is consistent with 
Reed et al. (2000) suggestion that firms that 
are highly leveraged tend to choose a high-
quality audit firms to enhance the credibility 
of their reports, and hence lower their cost of 
financing.  Contrary to expectation, the results 
surprisingly show a significantly negative 
relation between the hiring of a Big 4 auditor 
and firm’s affiliation to the finance industry. 
One possible explanation is that financial 
institution are more effective in monitoring 
practices and therefore may have a lesser 
need to hire a high-quality auditor (i.e., Big 4 
auditor). This result may be also due to the use 
of a small sample size (53 companies) with a 
relatively few cases of financial companies (15 
companies) in the logistic regression.
These later results, therefore, suggest that 
auditor choice in the Kuwaiti market is 
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significantly related to company’s financial 
leverage and affiliation to the finance sector, 
but not to company’s size. 
Robustness check:
To check for the robustness of the study’s results, 
alternative measures of both board size and 
AC size used in some earlier studies (Yermack 
1996; Ntim et al. 2015; Kalelkar, 2016) are 
employed. Specifically, the natural log of the 
number of board members (BD_SIZE2) and 
the natural log of the number of AC members 
(AC_SIZE2) are used as measures of board 
size and AC size, respectively. The natural 
log is used to control for any possible non-
linear relationship between auditor choice and 
these two variables. The results of the logistic 
regression model with the new measures of 
board size and AC size are shown in Table 4. 
As shown, the logistic regression results are 
almost the same, with the new measure of 
board size insignificantly related to auditor 
choice, and the new measure of the AC size 
showing a robustly positive relation to auditor 
choice evidence. The results of the robustness 
check suggest that the study’s findings related 
to the study’s research hypotheses are robust to 
the employment of alternative proxies for both 
board size and AC size. 
Table 3: Logistic Regression Results
B Wald Sig.
BD_SIZE .523 1.951 .162
BD_INDP 1.864 2.641 .104
BD_OWN -.443 .133 .716
AC_SIZE .437 3.420 .064*
AC_INDP -.400 .295 .587
SIZE .054 .025 .875
LEV 5.541 4.847 .028**
INDUS -2.074 4.224 .040**
Constant -6.248 1.055 .304
Regression summary statistics:
Model Chi-square 18.703            
-2 log likelihood 53.235
Overall correct 
classification 
percentage
58.5%
Cox and Snell 
R-square
.297
Nagelkerke R-square .400
Number of 
observations
53
**, *   p-value of statistical significance at the 0.05 level and the 0.10 level, respectively
(Endnotes)
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Additional non-parametric test: 
The relatively small number of observations 
used in the regression analyses has naturally 
weakened the statistical power of the regression 
equation. Therefore, additional analyses are 
performed using the non-parametric Mann-
Whitney U-test for the tested variables between 
firms with Big 4 firms versus non-Big 4 firms, 
and then between financial firms versus non-
financial firms. Table 5 provides the results of 
the Mann-Whitney test. As the results show, 
the Mann-Whitney U-test for the BD_SIZE 
variable that compares the board size between 
the Big 4 group and the non-Big 4 group is 
239.5, and appears to be significant (at the .05 
level). The results in Table 5 also show that 
all the other CG variables have insignificant 
Mann-Whitney tests. The non-parametric 
results, therefore, provide some support to H1 
of a significant relation between board size 
and company’s selection of a Big 4 audit firm, 
but not for H2, H3, H4, or H5. Additionally, 
the Mann-Whitney test is also computed to 
compare the CG variables between the financial 
firms group and the non-financial firms group. 
The results show that only the Mann-Whitney 
test of the AC_SIZE appears to be significantly 
different between financial firms versus non-
financial firms. Except for providing support 
to H1 instead of H4, the additional non-
parametric test analyses, appear to provide 
results that are close to those obtained using the 
original logistic regression analyses, especially 
those related to H2, H3, and H5.      
VI. CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of the present study is 
to investigate the relation between corporate 
governance variables and the decision of 
Kuwaiti companies to choose a “Big 4” external 
auditor. By doing so, the present study aims at 
extending previous auditor choice literature 
by presenting empirical findings about this 
relationship from one of the GCC countries 
(Kuwait) where this research topic has been 
rarely investigated. The reported results reveal 
that the selectin of a Big-4 auditor is related to 
AC size, firm’s leverage and the affiliation to 
a non-financial industry. The results, however, 
do not offer evidence of a significant relation 
between auditor choice and board size, board 
independence, directors’ shareholdings, AC 
independence, or company’s size. 
As the present study’s investigation is pertinent 
to data from a period of time preceding the 
effective implementation of CG rules in 
Kuwait, it provides an exceptional and transient 
opportunity for examining the impact of CG 
on audit quality (e.g., auditor choice) in the 
Kuwaiti market in a setting where CG processes 
and rules were mainly elected voluntarily by 
companies. Evidence about the effect of CG 
on aspects of audit quality from such a setting 
is anticipated to be of value not only for audit 
researchers, but also for market regulators. 
International researchers, for example, could 
also benefit from the empirical results offered 
by the present study in linking them to the 
existing findings about auditor choice and 
in performing future comparative analyses. 
Likewise, regulators could use the results 
provided in the present study for regulatory 
benchmarking purposes, and to determine 
areas where CG is more effective with respect 
to audit quality. The reported results are also 
anticipated to be useful to market regulators 
in furthering their understanding about the 
impacts and antecedences of CG practices on 
the quality of audits in the Kuwaiti market. 
Interpretation of the study’s findings should be 
made with some caveats. First, the size of the 
study sample is relatively small and pertains 
to only one year, which has unavoidably led 
to limiting the statistical power of the reported 
findings. This small sample size, however, is 
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typical in similar small markets, where the 
number of listed firms is relatively small. In 
addition, although the common rule-of-thumb 
used by researchers is to have 10 observations 
per independent variable, some statisticians 
(e.g., Vittinghoff, and  McCulloch, 2006) 
suggest that this rule may be relaxed in logistic 
regression with acceptable convergence and 
bias levels. Moreover, as this study’s objective 
is to examine auditor choice in a voluntary 
setting, researcher’s ability to gather more 
data was limited by the unavailability of 
public information about some CG variables 
for periods prior to 2016 when CG rules 
were mandated in the Kuwaiti market, and 
by the resultant shift in the CG context from 
voluntary adoption of CG procedures to 
adherence to mandatory CG rules, which could 
be a subject for future research to compare the 
impact of CG on auditor choice before and 
after the implementation of CG regulations 
in the Kuwaiti market. Future research is, 
therefore, needed to carry out similar empirical 
investigation using larger and multiple-year 
data sets. Another shortcoming of this study 
is the risk that the research equation employed 
may have disregarded some factors relevant to 
auditor choice. Although the research model 
employed is based on similar earlier research, 
the still immature theoretical underpinnings 
about the determinants of auditor choice in 
developing countries may have resulted in 
leaving out some contributory variables. 
Additional research is, therefore, needed to 
further exploring other CG variables related 
to auditor choice especially in the context of 
developing countries’ markets. For example, 
future related research could empirically 
explore the potential impact of AC financial 
expertise on auditor choice. Such a variable 
has been regarded as an important determinant 
of AC effectiveness, and hence, may have an 
impact on firm’s selection of the external audit 
firm.  Another limitation that future research 
should also strive to avoid is the use of some 
rusty measures of CG variables. For example, 
the use of the self-reported measure of AC 
independence should be replaced by more 
reliable archival measures. That would surely 
help enhancing the robustness of the reported 
empirical findings.   Another concern is related 
to the notable differences in statistics about some 
of the variables (e.g., board independence, Big 
4 audit firms) reported in the current study and 
those reported in other Kuwait-based studies 
(e.g., Alfraih, 2017), which raises a concern on 
whether the relatively small sample used by the 
current study (53 companies) is representative 
of all KSE listed firms, and hence may limit the 
generalizability of the study’s results. Another 
limitation lies in the use of a questionnaire 
survey to collect the CG data needed. The 
utilization of such a data gathering instrument 
may have negatively affected the robustness of 
the reported results. Future similar research, 
therefore, should try obtain this type of data 
from more reliable archival sources. 
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Appendix
Data Gathering Form
Name of the company:______________________
Please provide the information requested below for your 2012 fiscal year. 
1.  The industry to which your company belong:    
    Banking         Investment         Real Estate         Services         Insurance         Industry         
Food          Other (specify)________
2. What is the number of foreign subsidiaries of your company, if any? 
_________________________
3.  What is the number of business segments of your company? _________________________
4. Does your company have an internal audit function (unit)?              Yes               No
5. What is the number of staff of your company’s own internal audit unit? 
_________________
6.  If the internal audit function is outsourced? If yes, please specify:       Totally outsourced      
partially outsourced; %_______       
7.  Is there an audit committee in your company?       Yes         No     If yes, what is the number 
of audit committee members?____
8.  Are most of the audit committee members independent of the company?          Yes         No   
9. Is any of the audit committee members a member of the company’s board of directors?            
Yes         No     
10. Does the audit committee have members with accounting /auditing expertise?    Yes    No     
11. What is the number of audit committee meetings during the 2012 fiscal year?  
______________  
12. Does the audit committee review the internal audit budget?         Yes           No  
13. Is there a separate risk management committee in your company?       Yes         No     
14. Is there a risk manager in your company?       Yes         No
15. Is the company’s Chairman or CEO a member of the audit committee?            Yes         No
16. Does the board of directors’ shareholdings equal or exceed 5% of the company’s total 
shares outstanding?           Yes         No
17. What is the number of board members of your company? __________________
18. What is the number of board members who are independent from your company? 
______________
19. Is your company currently audited by Ernst and Young, Deloitte Touche, KPMG, or 
Pricewaterhouse?             Yes         No
20. What is the percentage of share ownership of the largest individual shareholder? 
%_______
Plus: variables from the company’s 2012 fiscal year annual report.
50 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AUDITOR CHOICE IN KUWAIT
SBE, Vol.21, No.1, 2018
ISSN 1818-1228
©Copyright 2018/College of Business and Economics,
Qatar University
Table 4: Alternative Logistic Regression Results
B Wald Sig.
BD_SIZE2 2.590 1.466 .226
BD_INDP 1.747 2.132 .144
BD_OWN -.722 .313 .576
AC_SIZE2 2.313 3.588 .058*
AC_INDP -.439 .342 .558
SIZE .140 .154 .695
LEV 5.786 4.884 .027**
INDUS -2.292 4.835 .028**
Constant -10.222 2.326 .127
Regression summary statistics:
Model Chi-square 19.8            
-2 log likelihood 53.235
Overall correct classification 
percentage
56.9%
Cox and Snell R-square .297
Nagelkerke R-square .400
Number of observations 53
**, *   p-value of statistical significance at the 0.05 level and the 0.10 level, respectively             
Table 5: Results for the Mann-Whitney U-Test 
 Big 4 vs. non-Big 4 Financial vs. non-Financial firms
Mean Rank Mean Rank
               
Big 4
             
Non-
Big 4
Mann-
Whit.
 U-test
Sig.
     
Financial Non-
Financial
Mann-
Whit. 
U-test
Sig.
BD_SIZE 31,61 23,73 239.5 .046* 31,97 24,04 210.5 .109
BD_INDP 30,36 24,61 267.0 .163 27,67 26,74 275.0 .836
BD_OWN 26,18 27,58 323.0 .600 27,47 26,82 278.0 .824
AC_SIZE 30,27 24,68 269.0 .177 33,80 24,32 183.0 .036*
AC_INDP 26,25 27,53 324.5 .731 27,13 26,95 283.0 .964
Endnotes:
 Using an exchange rate of KD1 = $3.3, which was the prevailing rate at the time of performing 
the analysis.
At the time of this study, AC formation in Kuwait was voluntary as no rules existed mandating 
such a formation.
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